University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Real Estate Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

1-2009

Mortgage Put Options and Real Estate Markets
Andrey Pavlov
Susan M. Wachter
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/real-estate_papers
Part of the Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Pavlov, A., & Wachter, S. M. (2009). Mortgage Put Options and Real Estate Markets. The Journal of Real
Estate Finance and Economics, 38 (1), 89-103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11146-008-9144-0

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/real-estate_papers/33
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Mortgage Put Options and Real Estate Markets
Abstract
In this paper we offer direct evidence that financial intermediation does impact underlying asset markets.
We develop a specific observable symptom of a banking system that underprices the put option
imbedded in non-recourse asset-backed lending. Using a dataset for 19 countries and over 500 real
estate investment trusts, we find that, following a negative demand shock, the “underpricing” economies
experience far deeper asset market crashes than economies in which the put option is correctly priced.

Keywords
real estate bubble, mortgage lending put options, Asian financial crisis

Disciplines
Real Estate

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/real-estate_papers/33

Mortgage put options and real estate markets
Andrey Pavlov
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
and
Simon Fraser University
E-mail: apavlov@wharton.upenn.edu

Susan Wachter
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
E-mail: Wachter@wharton.upenn.edu
April 18, 2008

Keywords: real estate bubble, mortgage lending put options, Asian financial crisis
JEL: G21
We thank John Clapp, Robert Edelstein, David Geltner, David Ling, the participants of the
Cambridge-Maastricht-MIT real estate symposium and the Homer Hoyt Spring Meeting for
valuable comments and suggestions. We thank Dr. Christopher Shun, CFP® of Menang
Corporation, Malaysia, for insightful discussions related to this paper and the Global
Property Research Indices used in this research. Andrey Pavlov gratefully acknowledges
support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. All errors
remain our own.

Mortgage put options and real estate markets
In this paper we offer direct evidence that financial intermediation does impact
underlying asset markets. We develop a specific observable symptom of a banking system
that underprices the put option imbedded in non-recourse asset-backed lending. Using a
dataset for 19 countries and over 500 real estate investment trusts, we find that, following a
negative demand shock, the “underpricing” economies experience far deeper asset market
crashes than economies in which the put option is correctly priced.
Keywords: real estate bubble, mortgage lending put options, Asian financial crisis
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1. Introduction
All non-recourse asset-backed mortgage loans contain a put option that allows the
borrower, through default, to “sell” the asset to the lender for the outstanding mortgage
balance. The default spread compensates the lender for this put option. If correctly priced,
the imbedded put option has no impact on asset markets. If, however, the put is
underpriced, efficient asset markets incorporate this mistake into the transaction price of the
asset. This leads to inflated asset prices above their fundamental level.1
The subprime mortgage crisis and the recent price boom in the US, now reversed, is
the most recent example of a price bubble associated with lax and expanding access to
credit. The concern that price rises in the US were artificially fuelled by new and exotic
mortgage instruments that embody overly liberal lending standards led to an advisory of
caution in the use of these instruments in September, 2006.2 This paper does not offer a
mechanism to measure the extent of a market bubble before they burst, but it does offer a
mechanism to examine the impact of lending practices prevalent in the market on their
potential severity.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, utilizing the theory of Pavlov and
Wachter (2004, 2006), we develop a specific and observable symptom of underpricing of
non-recourse asset backed lending (discussed in Section 2) . Our symptom distinguishes
between rational changes in the lending spread and those associated with the underpricing

1

See Allen and Gale (1998 and 1999) and Pavlov and Wachter (2002, 2005) for models that show how
underpricing of the put option leads to inflated asset prices.
2
See “Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks”
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/SRLetters/2006/SR0615a2.pdf)
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of the put option. We show the second is associated with unsustainable price rises and,
therefore, deeper crashes.
While the literature has associated underpricing with rising asset prices, in this
paper we develop a specific symptom of underpricing in mortgage markets and develop a
model to show that this symptom is associated with price rises in efficient equity markets
only when there is underpricing of the put option. Our symptom distinguishes between
rational changes in the lending spread and those associated with the underpricing of the put
option. We show the second is associated with unsustainable price rises and, therefore,
deeper crashes.
Second, using data from 19 countries and over 500 individual real estate investment
trusts and property companies, we empirically find, as we would expect, that following a
negative demand shock, markets which exhibit the symptom of underpricing tend to
experience far deeper market crashes than markets that do not exhibit the symptom.
Following a negative demand shock, the asset prices in an economy which experiences
underpricing have to fall far enough not only to reflect the new supply and demand
conditions but also to eliminate the prior credit-induced price rise. Therefore, economies
that experience underpricing, while not necessarily subject to a higher risk of market
crashes, are subject to deeper crashes, all else equal, when they occur.
This finding is direct evidence that financial intermediation does impact the
underlying asset markets if the intermediaries misprice the loans they provide.
Intermediaries’ misaligned incentives, such as focus on short-term results and market share,
government-sponsored deposit insurance and/or bailout tendencies, and/or takeover barriers

4

make underpriced lending in any sector possible and even likely. This problem is
compounded for real estate-backed mortgage lending because of lack of proper pricing
data, heterogeneity of the underlying assets, and prolonged price cycles. In this paper we
document, both theoretically and empirically, that loan underpricing does impact the
underlying markets, even if these markets are efficient.
Furthermore, we find no relationship between our measure of underpricing and the
size of the market decline using data after the decline. This suggests that, as expected, our
theory only holds before the market crash.
This study develops an economic indicator, or symptom, of loan underpricing. It
does not address the issue of why underpricing might occur and how to prevent it. For a
detailed discussing of the causes and potential remedies of underpricng please refer to
Pavlov and Wachter (2004, 2006) and Herring and Wachter (1999).
This study is distinct from the literature which estimates the fundamental price of an
asset directly and detects asset price inflation by comparing the estimated to the observed
price.3 Rather the specific and observable symptom of underpricing that we develop here is
likely to be found in an economy in which asset bubbles are being supported by lending
behavior. In addition to finding support for the theory, the findings give policy makers and
market participants a measurable symptom of underpricing. If such underpricing is
suspected, policy makers and regulators can take steps to eliminate it or at least contain its
market-wide impact: both lenders and market participants can take measures to prepare for
3

See for instance Smith, Smith, and Thompson (2005) for a direct estimation of real estate values in Los
Angeles. Other studies and popular articles on the fundamental real estate values include Case and Shiller
(2003), Krainer and Wei (2004), Krugman (2005), Leamer (2002), McCarthy and Peach (2004), and Shiller
(2005), Edelstein (2005) and Edelstein, Dokko, Lacayo, and Lee (1999), among others.
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or hedge the expected increased magnitude of future price declines should a negative
demand shock occur. Indeed while underpriced lending may not initiate unsustainable
“asset bubbles” thereby causing market crashes, the underpricing of risk makes these
crashes worse.
Koh, et. al. (2006) investigate the mortgage lending institutional arrangements
across countries to directly assess the likelihood of an economy entering an underpricing
equilibrium. Consistent with the results reported here, they find that lending industry
institutional mechanisms that are prone to underpricing tend to exacerbate market crashes.
This study provides support for the recent sentiment arguments put forward in
Clayton, Ling, and Naranjo (2007). They examine the time-series and cross-sectional
variation in MSA-level cap rates by measuring investment sentiment. Such sentiment is a
source of market inefficiency and, as demonstrated by Herring and Wachter (1999), is
unlikely to be sustainable without supportive lending policies.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 develops the symptom of underpricing and
formulates the testable empirical implication discussed above. Section 3 describes the data,
presents the main results, and provides robustness analysis utilizing various controls and
econometric tests. Section 4 concludes with policy implications and direction for future
research.
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2. The Symptom of Underpricing
The spread between duration-matched bank lending and deposit rates for a nonrecourse loan is the value of the imbedded put option.4 There are two reasons for the
lending spread to fall. First, the default spread can narrow because the expected future
asset price volatility falls, which, in turn, reduces the value of the put option. This is a
rational reason to reduce the lending spread and has no impact on asset prices. Note that a
change in the volatility of the asset has no impact on the asset price if investors are
diversified.5 We address the possibility that investors are not diversified below.
The second reason lending spreads narrow is that lenders underprice the default
risk. This increases asset prices because rational investors take advantage of the
underpriced non-recourse lending even if they are fully diversified.
The transaction price of an asset financed through a non-recourse loan is the
composite of the fundamental value of the asset, V, the value of the mortgage loan, M, and
the face value of the adjustable-rate mortgage loan, B:

P = V (σ ) − M (σ , s (σ )) + B ,

(1)

where σ denotes the expected future volatility of the asset and s denotes the spread of
lending over deposit rates. This spread compensates the lender for the put option imbedded
in the non-recourse mortgage. If the mortgage is priced correctly, its market value equals

4

The lending spread also covers the bank’s operating costs, but these are relatively small and constant
throughout the market cycle.
5
If investors are diversified, only covariance with the overall economy affects the price of the asset. (see for
instance Sharpe, 1964). Even if the fortunes of real estate markets have an impact on the overall economy,
changes in asset volatility will have a smaller, second-order effect on the asset price when compared to the
effect on an underpricied option to default.
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its face value, and the transaction price equals the fundamental value of the asset. If the
mortgage is mispriced, then the transaction price reflects not only the fundamental value of
the asset, but also the mispricing of the mortgage, B − M (σ , s (σ )) . If the market value of

the mortgage is below the face value of the mortgage, then the transaction price exceeds the
fundamental value of the asset because efficient equity markets take advantage of the
mispricing and the asset is assumed to be of fixed supply.
If the lending spread, s, changes in response to σ,
∂s
>0
∂σ
∂P ∂V ∂M ∂M ∂s ∂V
=
−
−
=
≈0
∂σ ∂σ ∂σ
∂s ∂σ ∂σ

(2)

Since the spread adjusts to compensate the lender for the changes in the value of the
put option imbedded in the mortgage loan,

the asset is fully diversifiable, then

∂M ∂M ∂s
+
= 0 . If the change in volatility of
∂σ
∂s ∂σ

∂V
= 0 . If the increase in volatility affects the
∂σ

covariance of the asset return with the market, then

∂V
< 0 , but still relatively small.6
∂σ

The response of the asset price to the spread is:
∂P
∂V
∂P
∂σ =
∂σ ≈ 0
=
∂
∂
s
s
∂s
∂σ
∂σ

(3)

6

The price impact of real estate volatility changes through the covariance with the overall market are likely to
be far smaller then the impact through changing the value of the option to default.
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Therefore, the correlation between transaction prices and lending spread is zero if
the increase in asset volatility is fully diversifiable, and close to zero if it affects the
covariance between the asset and the overall market.
If, on the other hand, the spread changes because of underpricing, not in response to
changes in expected future asset volatility, the response of the price to the spread is very
different:
∂s
∂V
∂M
= 0,
= 0,
> 0,
∂σ
∂s
∂s

(4)

∂P ∂V ∂M
∂M
=
−
=−
< 0.
∂s ∂s
∂s
∂s

(5)

therefore,

Thus, the correlation between asset prices and lending spread is negative and driven
by the sensitivity of the value of the mortgage to the lending spread, which is substantial.
The above differential impact of default spread on asset prices produces the
following symptom of underpricing:
Underpricing of the default risk in non-recourse lending produces a negative
correlation between asset returns and changes in the default spread. Correctly
pricing the default risk in non-recourse lending produces no correlation between
asset returns and changes in the default spread.
Following an asset market negative demand shock, “underpricing” economies
experience deeper market crashes because the new asset price not only reflects the new
9

supply and demand conditions, but also eliminates the price rises due to underpricing. This
leads to the following empirical implication:
Economies that experience underpricing (i.e., have a negative correlation between
asset returns and changes in the default spread), can be expected to experience
larger market crashes, all else equal, following negative demand shocks.
Narrowing of the lending spread is not sufficient evidence of underpricing or asset
price inflation. Instead, we need to observe a negative correlation between the lending
spread and asset prices to suspect underpricing. Moreover to determine whether the
phenomenon of underpricing is contributing to higher asset prices we need to observe a
positive relationship, all else equal, between the correlation and asset price rises. While
theoretically appealing, this approach does limit the practical applicability of our symptom
as a tool to detect and combat underpricing. Estimating the correlation requires a number
of observations and introduces a substantial time lag between the start of underpricing and
its detection. Nonetheless, a measurable symptom is useful for countries and markets that
track and report lending activity and asset prices in a timely fashion. Absent the symptom
we propose here, even these markets may not be able to detect underpricing before a market
crash occurs. Thus we develop and implement a test for whether underpricing contributes
to asset price inflation based on the statistically significant joint presence of price rises and
a negative correlation of the narrowing of the lending spread with asset price rises across
countries, using an international database of property returns. Furthermore, we test the
sequential presence of negative correlation and large price declines following a negative
demand shock. We also test the absence of negative correlation in all markets following a
negative demand shock.
10

Finally, if investors are not diversified, the changes in expected future asset
volatility will impact the asset prices. This, in turn, could produce the negative correlation
between asset returns and changes in the lending spread. However, in this case economies
that exhibit the negative correlation will not exhibit larger market crashes than economies
that do not. If anything, the possibility that the marginal investor in a particular country is
not diversified would bias our findings towards zero.
3. Empirical Support

To test the above theoretical predictions we need, at the minimum, property return
data and the spread of lending over deposit rates for a number of countries and property
types. Duration-matched lending and deposit rates are available from the World Bank.7
The theoretical framework above refers to the default spread, which is only one component
of the lending spread. Thus, our empirical analysis assumes that the remaining components
of the lending spread, such as prepayment options and servicing costs, remain unchanged
throughout the business cycle.8 Furthermore, we need to assume that changes in the
lending over deposit spreads in the economy are representative of changes in the real estate
mortgage lending rate over the deposit rate spread.9
In this paper we utilize is the Global Property Research Indices (GPR) described in
Eichholtz (1996). These data include property indices for 25 countries over 20 and 12

7

World Bank World Economic Indicators CD-ROM.
In fact, virtually all commercial loans contain substantial prepayment penalties, so the option to prepay is
not worth very much.
9
In addition to the deposit rate, one could use measures of the default spread based on the cost of capital for
the lender or other risk-free securities, such as Treasuries. In this analysis we use deposit rates primarily
because they are measured precisely and available for all countries in our sample.
8
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years for developed and emerging countries, respectively. We utilize the GPR Genral
database, which includes 543 international REITs and property companies.
This data set has a number of advantages. In particular, it has the deepest history
and the largest cross-sectional span across the globe of any real estate property database.
Since the returns are based on publicly traded and liquid securities, the data quality is high,
and is consistent through time. Table 1 provides a summary statistic of the data, including
the number of REITs available in each country.
The most direct test of the theoretical model described above is a negative
relationship between the correlation of the change in lending spread and asset returns
before the crash and the total price decline during the crash for each market. Figures 1 and
2 depict scatter plots of all included observations. The correlation is computed using a 5year window in Figure 1, and using all available data in Figure 2. The horizontal axis
depicts the correlation between asset price changes, excluding dividends, in local currency,
and the change in lending over deposit rate spread before the respective market crash. The
vertical axis reports the percent decline, from top to bottom, during the most recent market
crash for each country. In some cases this decline spanned only a few months, while for
others it took a year or two. Therefore, the vertical axis depicts the total decline, not
annualized or adjusted for the time frame it took for prices to adjust.
Our theory predicts that a large negative correlation between asset returns and
changes in lending spreads is a symptom of loan underpricing. Loan underpricing results in
asset price inflation. Countries that experience loan underpricing (and asset overpricing)
before their negative demand shock tend to experience far greater price declines during

12

their market crash. Consistent with this, countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Belgium,
and Sweden exhibit a large negative correlation between asset returns and changes in the
lending spread before their respective crashes. These same countries experienced very
large price declines following their negative demand shocks, of 50 to 85%. Economies like
The Netherlands, New Zealand, and Switzerland exhibited no or positive correlation
between asset returns and lending spreads. These countries, therefore, did not exhibit the
symptom of loan underpricing developed in Section 2. While they also experienced
negative demand shocks, their price declines were relatively more modest, between 10 and
40%. As a robustness check, we perform this regression by excluding all observations one
at a time, and all possible combinations of two observations at a time. The slope coefficient
remains significant at the 5% level in all of these regressions. In other words, there is no
one observation or a combination of two observations whose removal substantially
influences our results. These findings are consistent with the theory that a negative
correlation between asset returns and changes in lending spreads is a symptom of
underpricing, and that underpricing exacerbates market downturns.
Pavlov and Wachter (2004, 2006) suggest that after a negative demand shock there
should be no relationship between the correlation of asset price changes and deposit spreads
on one hand and the size of the market decline, on the other. We compute our symptom of
underpricing, i.e., the correlation between asset returns and changes in the lending spread,
following the negative demand shock in each country. Figures 3 and 4 display these
estimates using 5-year windows and all available data, respectively. Following the negative
demand shock, there is no relationship between the correlation of asset returns and changes
in the lending spread and the magnitude of the previous crash. As a robustness check,
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excluding one or two observations at a time does not generate a statistically significant
relationship either.
Finally, we repeat the above analysis at the individual REIT level. Figures 5 and 6
provide scatter plots of the correlation between asset price changes and changes in the
default spread versus the size of the market decline. Figure 5 reports the data using 5-year
window to compute the correlations, while Figure 6 uses all available data. Both results
strongly suggest that funds that seem to be able to take advantage of loan underpricing
experience larger price declines following negative demand shocks. While we also report
the regression estimates of these results, we note that the observations are not strictly
independent, as REITs within a country tend to be highly correlated.
Figures 7 and 8 report the correlation versus the magnitude of price declines using
data after the price decline. These two figures are analogous to Figures 3 and 4, except
they use REIT-level data. Again, as predicted by the theory, there is no relationship
between the correlation and the magnitude of price declines.
4. Summary and Policy Conclusions

In this paper we develop a specific and observable symptom of loan underpricing in
the economy. This symptom is based on the relationship between changes in the lending
spread and changes in asset prices. If the put option in non-recourse loans is underpriced,
then we expect this correlation to be negative, as narrowing spreads are an indicator of
underpricing which is taken into account by equity investors.
While this economic indicator of underpricing is unable to detect market bubbles
before they burst, it does allow us to examine the impact of lending practices prevalent in
14

the market on the underlying property markets, especially when those market bubbles burst.
We find that countries that experience severe underpricing also experience far deeper
market declines, when those declines occur. This is an intuitive finding, as the post-crash
asset price needs reflect not only the new, lower, demand fundamentals, but also eliminate
the impact loan underpricing had pre-crash.
By any measure, mid-2000’s real-estate markets in many countries around the globe
appear to have been at, or above, their historic highs; nonetheless it is very difficult to
accurately detect a real-estate bubble. While we offer no remedy to this predicament, there
are historical precedents around the globe that do provide some insights for evaluating real
estate markets around the world. If there is one thing that the most severe real-estate
bubbles have had in common, it is easy access to low-cost credit. When this happens, realestate investors and homeowners take advantage of it and bid up land prices above their
fundamental levels. While this may or may not start a market price bubble, it certainly
enables the bubble formation and makes it worse. If the lending standards in this type of
environment are lax, or weakened further, in order to increase profits for lenders, the risk of
a bubble is heightened. The bubble then bursts when market prices exceed the fundamental
values of the underlying properties by so much that even virtually costless financing cannot
generate more demand.
The more reckless the lending industry is, the longer the bubble can survive, and the
harder it bursts. For instance, we find in this paper that the lending sector was a major
contributor to the real-estate price bubble in the mid-1990s in countries such as Thailand,
Malaysia, and Indonesia. Conversely, other economies, such as Switzerland and Hong
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Kong, maintained far more restrictive lending practices, and, we find that the lending
sector did not contribute to the price inflation in these countries. While all of the countries
in our study experienced deep price declines during their respective crisis, these declines
were two to three times more severe in the countries where access to funds for real-estate
development or ownership was unrestricted and very cheap.
Empirical evidence from earlier real-estate market bubbles across the globe also
seems to strongly support this idea. In a recent case, John Laker, Chairman of the
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority, suggested that lax lending standards in
Australia contributed to Australia's real-estate boom. In response, the Regulatory
Authority implemented steps to strengthen bank lending standards to prevent further price
inflation due to excessive availability of funds. Similarly, as noted above, in response to
historic price rises, a similar lending advisory was issued in the US. Both of these were
responses to eroding lending standards. To the extent policies are in place and can prevent
pro-cyclical easing of lending standards, this source of instability can be avoided. This is
difficult, since collateralized lending depends on loan-to-value ratios. As we have shown in
this paper, values can be artificially raised due to mortgage loan underpricing. Thus, there
is an inherit difficulty in developing and implementing such policies. Nonetheless, it
appears from our data, that some countries have been more successful than others in
maintaining prudential lending standards.
The bottom line is that we are still unable to detect market bubbles before they
burst, but at least we can examine the impact of lending practices prevalent in the market
on their potential severity. Furthermore, the model shows the extent to which lending-

16

industry regulators can mitigate the economic impact of a potential bubble by enforcing
prudent lending standards.
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Table 1: Description of the data by country
Countries

No. of
funds

Included in
regression:
yes/no

Experienced
decline:
yes/no

Year of
decline

Total
Decli
ne

decline
lasting (in
years)

Argentina

1
41
12
13
43
58
17
36
2
6
9
60
101
16
2
18
4
11
3
3
7
28
30
18
4
543

no*
yes
no*
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no**
yes
yes
yes
no***
yes
no***
yes
yes
yes
no***

n/a
yes
n/a
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
n/a
yes
yes
yes
n/a
yes
n/a
yes
yes
yes
n/a

2001
2000
n/a
1997
1998
2000
1991
1997
1999
1997
1995
1997
1992
1997
n/a
1999
1990
1997
n/a
2000
n/a
1997
1995
1999
n/a

‐62%
‐15%
n/a
‐67%
‐32%
‐23%
‐18%
‐30%
‐32%
‐62%
‐21%
‐36%
‐25%
‐69%
n/a
‐25%
‐11%
‐25%
n/a
‐19%
‐40%
‐56%
‐58%
‐19%
n/a

2
1
n/a
4
1
2
4
1
3
3
4
1
2
1
n/a
2
4
4
n/a
1
n/a
1
1
2
n/a

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
France
Germany
Hong Kong
Ireland
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
United Kingdom
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
New Zealand
Portugal
Philippines
Spain
Singapore
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Total No. of Funds

*due to insufficiency of spread data
**due to unreliability of total return data
***due to insufficiency of total return data
Total Return Data for computing :
Data source : GPR General
1980 Jan – 1996 Nov
Spread is computed as the difference between lending and deposit rate
Date source: World Bank CD

Table 1 provides the number of REITs by country and information on the timing of the
REIT declines.
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Figure 1: Symptom of Loan Underpricing Vs. Total Market Decline (5-year window)

The correlation is computed between the change in index value, excluding dividends, and
the change in the spread of lending over deposit rates. In this figure, we compute the
correlation using 5-year window before each crash. The vertical axis depicts the total
percent decline in the property market, from top to bottom. This is over one or more years
and is specific for each country. According to our theory, negative correlation is a
symptom of loan underpricing (asset overpricing), and is associated with larger losses
during a market downturn. Countries that do not exhibit the symptom of loan underpricing
have zero or positive correlation, and their respective property market declines are
relatively modest.
The statistics of the regression line are as follows:
Estimate
t-statistic

Intercept
.29
(8.03)

Slope
-.25
(-3.48)

R2
.41
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Figure 2: Symptom of Loan Underpricing Vs. Total Market Decline (all data)

The correlation is computed between the change in index value, excluding dividends, and
the change in the spread of lending over deposit rates. In this figure, we compute the
correlation using all available data before the crash, i.e., from the beginning of our data set
to the peak of the property market. The vertical axis depicts the total percent decline in the
property market, from top to bottom. This is over one or more years and is specific for
each country. According to our theory, negative correlation is a symptom of loan
underpricing (asset overpricing), and is associated with larger losses during a market
downturn. Countries that do not exhibit the symptom of loan underpricing have zero or
positive correlation, and their respective property market declines are relatively modest.
The statistics of the regression line are as follows:
Estimate
t-statistic

Intercept
.28
(6.12)

Slope
-.29
(-2.16)

R2
.21
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Figure 3: Symptom of Underpricing Vs. Total Market Crash Decline (Using 5-year
Window After the Crash)
corelation vs decline(after crash)
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The correlation is computed between change in index value, excluding dividends, and the
change in the spread of lending over deposit rates. In this figure, we compute the
correlation using 5-year window after the crash. The vertical axis depicts the total percent
decline in the country index, from top to bottom. This is over one or more years and is
specific for each country. As expected, we find no relationship between the correlation
between asset returns and changes in lending spreads and the size of the decline.
The statistics of the regression line are as follows:
Estimate
t-statistic

Intercept
.34
(7.27)

Slope
.04
(.49)

R2
.02
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Figure 4: Symptom of Underpricing Vs. Total Market Crash Decline (Using All Data
After the Crash)
corelation vs decline(after crash)
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The correlation is computed between change in index value, excluding dividends, and the
change in the spread of lending over deposit rates. In this figure, we compute the
correlation using all available data after the crash. The vertical axis depicts the total
percent decline in the country index, from top to bottom. This is over one or more years
and is specific for each country. As expected, we find no relationship between the
correlation between asset returns and changes in lending spreads and the size of the decline.
The statistics of the regression line are as follows:
Estimate
t-statistic

Intercept
.34
(7.38)

Slope
.07
(.73)

R2
.03
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Figure 5: Symptom of Loan Underpricing Vs. Total Market Decline
(REIT-level, 5-year window)
corelation vs decline(before crash)
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This figure is analogous to Figure 1, except it uses REIT-level data to test our theory. The
correlation is computed between the change in REIT share value, excluding dividends, and
the change in the spread of lending over deposit rates. In this figure, we compute the
correlation using 5-year window before each crash. The vertical axis depicts the total
percent decline in the property market, from top to bottom. This is over one or more years
and is specific for each country. According to our theory, negative correlation is a
symptom of loan underpricing (asset overpricing), and is associated with larger losses
during a market downturn. Countries that do not exhibit the symptom of loan underpricing
have zero or positive correlation, and their respective property market declines are
relatively modest.
The statistics of the regression line are as follows:
Estimate
t-statistic

Intercept
.39
(21.13)

Slope
-.2
(-5.06)

R2
.16
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Figure 6: Symptom of Loan Underpricing Vs. Total Market Decline (all data)
corelation vs decline(before crash)
120%
y = ‐0.214x + 0.371
(‐4.91)

100%

(19.45)

R² = 0.154

decline

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%

‐150%

‐100%

‐50%

0%

50%

100%

Correlation(all available before‐crash data)

This figure is analogous to Figure 2, except it uses REIT-level data to test our theory. The
correlation is computed between the change in REIT share value, excluding dividends, and
the change in the spread of lending over deposit rates. In this figure, we compute the
correlation using all available data before each crash. The vertical axis depicts the total
percent decline in the property market, from top to bottom. This is over one or more years
and is specific for each country. According to our theory, negative correlation is a
symptom of loan underpricing (asset overpricing), and is associated with larger losses
during a market downturn. Countries that do not exhibit the symptom of loan underpricing
have zero or positive correlation, and their respective property market declines are
relatively modest.
The statistics of the regression line are as follows:
Estimate
t-statistic

Intercept
.37
(19.45)

Slope
-.21
(-4.91)

R2
.15
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Figure 7: Symptom of Underpricing Vs. Total Market Crash Decline (Using 5-year
Window After the Crash)
corelation vs decline(after crash)
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This figure is analogous to Figure 3, except it uses REIT-level data. The correlation is
computed between the change in REIT share price, excluding dividends, and the change in
the spread of lending over deposit rates. In this figure, we compute the correlation using 5year window after the crash. The vertical axis depicts the total percent decline in the
country index, from top to bottom. This is over one or more years and is specific for each
country. As expected, we find no relationship between the correlation between asset
returns and changes in lending spreads and the size of the decline.
The statistics of the regression line are as follows:
Estimate
t-statistic

Intercept
.43
(14.69)

Slope
.05
(.73)

R2
.01
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Figure 8: Symptom of Underpricing Vs. Total Market Crash Decline (Using All Data
After the Crash)
corelation vs decline(after crash)
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This figure is analogous to Figure 4, except it uses REIT-level data. The correlation is
computed between the change in REIT share price, excluding dividends, and the change in
the spread of lending over deposit rates. In this figure, we compute the correlation using all
available data after the crash. The vertical axis depicts the total percent decline in the
country index, from top to bottom. This is over one or more years and is specific for each
country. As expected, we find no relationship between the correlation between asset
returns and changes in lending spreads and the size of the decline.
The statistics of the regression line are as follows:
Estimate
t-statistic

Intercept
.42
(14.44)

Slope
.,02
(.24)

R2
0
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